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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
The following additional issues are raised by 
appellee's brief: 
1. Is slander an intentional tort, such that the 
employer must intend the harm in order to be vicariously liable? 
2. Can slanderous statements be negligent, and yet not 
be deemed to be an "accident under the Act?" 
3. Has Mounteer raised a claim for damage to 
reputation and other "proprietary" damages, or is his claim 
exclusively for personal injuries, as claimed by UP&L? 
DETERMINATIVE RULES 
Determinative rules which apply to this case are Rules 
8(a) and (f) , which appear under the title "General Rules of 
Pleading," They are: 
(a) Claims for relief, A pleading which 
sets forth a claim for relief, whether an 
original claim, counterclaim, cross-claim or 
third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short 
and plain statement of the claim showing that 
the pleader is entitled to relief; and (2) a 
demand for judgment for the relief to which 
he deems himself entitled. Relief in the 
alternative or of several different types may 
be demanded. 
(f) Construction of Pleadings. All 
pleadings shall be so construed as to do 
substantial justice. 
1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT IN REPLY 
UP&L claims that the employment relationship by itself 
bars Mounteer's slander suit under the Workers1 Compensation Act 
(the "Act") . However, slander is not the type of injury 
contemplated within the coverage formula of the Act, and thus is 
not barred. No decided case has ever held such. Assuming that 
slander is not within the coverage formula of the Act, Mounteer 
is not compelled to prove that UP&L intended him harm in order to 
establish UP&L's vicarious liability. An employer's intent to 
harm the injured employee is only required as an exception to 
exclusivity in cases within the coverage formula of the Act and 
where the tort involved is intentional. Since slander is outside 
the coverage formula of the Act, and is not an intentional tort, 
Mounteer does not have to prove UP&L's intent to harm in order to 
maintain his cause of action. 
UP&L's claim that Mounteer admits that Larsen's acts 
were intentional because Mounteer denies an "accident under the 
Act," are misplaced. There is no "accident under the Act" 
because slander is not within the coverage formula of workers' 
compensation. The slander may still be "accidental" in the sense 
of being negligent, and not be an accident under the Act for 
policy reasons. 
Although UP&L claims the contrary, Mounteer does state 
a valid cause of action in slander for reputation and other 
proprietary damages. This conclusion is borne out not only by 
2 
the words in the complaint per se, but also by indulging 
Mounteer with all reasonable inferences and facts that can be 
proven, as the court must do in a motion to dismiss. Mounteer1 s 
slander claim is not "exclusively" for personal injury damages, 
as UP&L claims. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIP, BY ITSELF, DOES 
NOT BAR MOUNTEER1 S SUIT AGAINST HIS EMPLOYER. 
MOUNTEER DOES NOT HAVE TO SHOW THAT UP&L 
DIRECTED OR INTENDED HIM HARM IN ORDER TO 
ESTABLISH VICARIOUS LIABILITY FOR SLANDER. 
SLANDER IS NOT ALWAYS AN INTENTIONAL TORT. 
Utah Power & Light ("UP&L") claims: (1) the employment 
relationship itself bars Mounteer's suit under all circumstances; 
and (2) to establish vicarious liability, Mounteer must prove 
that UP&L "directed or intended the injurious act or the injury." 
UP&L Brief, p. 8. Both propositions are seriously flawed. 
A. The Employment Relationship With UP&L Does Not Bar 
Mounteerfs Suit. UP&Lfs claim that the employment relation, by 
itself, bars Mounteerfs suit, has never been the law in Utah or 
anywhere in the United States. UP&L cites no case in support of 
this proposition. As pointed out in Mounteer !s main brief 
("Brief"), workers1 compensation exclusivity bars suit only 
where there is "an accident," which produces an "injury." Unless 
"... the injury falls within the coverage formula of the act," 
civil suit is not barred. Larson, Workman's Compensation, Desk 
3 
Ed,. §65, p.12-1 (10/89) (hereinafter "Larson").1 No decided 
case from the beginning of workers' compensation until the 
present, to the best of counsel's knowledge, has ever held that 
slander is the type of injury which falls within the coverage 
formula of the Act, even when it involves physical or mental 
injury as a significant component. See cases cited in Mounteer's 
Brief, pp. 9-15. 
Although the main issue is whether slander committed 
within the scope of employment,2 falls within the coverage 
formula of the Act, UP&L barely discusses the issue in its brief 
(only 9 lines of argument on pp. 12-13). UP&L's side-stepping of 
this issue is tantamount to an admission that Mounteer is 
correct, i.e., slander is not within the coverage formula of the 
Act, and civil suit is not barred.3 
1
 "Larson" refers to the renowned worker's compensation 
treatise. "Larsen" refers to the UP&L security guard assigned to 
investigate Mounteer for possible drug use. 
2
 Although an issue was initially raised at the trial court 
as to whether Larsen's words were uttered "within the scope of 
employment," the Court of Appeals sustained Mounteer's arguments 
in this regard, and UP&L lodged no cross appeal. Should the 
issue be raised, Mounteer incorporates in response Point I of his 
brief to the Court of Appeals. 
3
 Mounteer cites six relevant cases spanning a 50 year 
period in support of his bold statement that a slander action is 
not barred under workers' compensation, and that no reported 
cases support UP&L on this proposition. Yet, UP&Lfs brief is 
silent on the issue. Mounteer cites several passages from 
Professor Larson's respected commentary Workmanf s Compensation to 
the effect that an action for slander should not be barred by 
exclusivity, even when it involves personal injuries. UP&L does 
not challenge this treatise. To the best of counsel's knowledge, 
the Utah Supreme Court has never disagreed with Professor Larson 
on any significant point dealing with workers' compensation law. 
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B. Intentional Harm Not Required. UP&L argues that 
even if the employment relationship itself does not preclude 
suit, Mounteer is still barred because he cannot show that UP&L 
directed or intended the harm or injurious act, citing in support 
Bryan v. Utah Int'l, 533 P.2d 892 (Utah 1975). UP&L's brief 
misconstrues Bryan and misstates the law because it fails to 
distinguish between an "intentional injury" and an "intentional 
tort." Bryan stands for the proposition that an employer is not 
vicariously liable for the intentional battery by its employee, 
unless the employer intended the harm. UP&L erroneously assumes 
that since slander is allegedly an "intentional tort," 
"intentional harm" must therefore be proved; and since no intent 
to harm Mounteer is alleged, the complaint cannot legally stand.4 
UP&L misapplies Bryan, based on its erroneous view of 
the elements of slander. Bryan is factually and legally much 
different than Mounteer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 107 U.A.R. 71, 
773 P. 2d 405 (May 2, 1989) because it dealt with assault and 
battery, which by definition are intentional torts. Restatement 
of Torts, Second, §21 (assault) and §16 (battery). Mounteer has 
no quarrel with Bryanf s general statement of law, i.e. employer 
intent to harm must be shown to establish vicarious liability 
where the employee commits an intentional tort. Larson terms 
this an "almost unanimous rule." Larson, supra at §68.13, p. 13-
4 (1989). Bryan bases its holding on two sections of Larson, 
4
 UP&L's brief says: "In fact, Mounteer portrays UP&L as 
purely passive to Larsen's intentional torts." UP&L Brief, p. 9. 
5 
both of which dealt with unquestionably intentional torts: §68.23 
("torts directed or intended by employer") and §68.13 ("necessity 
for actual intent to injure"). Bryan, supra at 895. UP&L then 
erroneously reasons that since slander is an "intentional" tort, 
Larsen's harm is allegedly intentional. If Larsen's harm is 
intentional, under this convoluted view, UP&L isn't liable 
unless it intended to harm Mounteer. However, if the slander is 
not an intentional tort and/or Larsen did not intend to harm, 
UP&L's logic falls apart. 
The first faulty premise is that slander is an 
intentional tort. It is not; slander may also be reckless or 
negligent.5 The Restatement of Torts, Second, §580B provides: 
One who publishes a false and defamatory 
communication concerning a private person ... 
is subject to liability, if, but only if, he 
(a) knows that the statement is false and 
that it defames the other, (b) acts in 
reckless disregard of these matters, or (c) 
acts negligently in failing to ascertain 
them, (emphasis added). 
See also Restatement of Torts, Second, §558(c). 
The next faulty premise is that Larsen's acts were 
intentional. Without discovery, Mounteer has no way of knowing 
whether Larsen's acts were "intentional" with respect to the 
harm. Certainly Larsen intended to speak; however, it is highly 
doubtful (but unknown) that she actually intended to harm 
5
 This exposes a significant, unresolved question of fact 
as to whether the slander was in fact intentional or merely 
careless. This factual dispute only becomes relevant in a motion 
to dismiss where, as here, the law does not support UP&L. 
Therefore, factual issues must be resolved at trial. 
6 
Mounteer. It is more likely that she negligently placed the call 
on the loudspeaker unaware that the whole mine was listening. 
Since all reasonable inferences must be indulged in favor of the 
party opposing the motion to dismiss, the court should assume 
that Larsen1 s statements were negligent. If that is the case, 
Bryan does not apply because it deals with an intentional tort; 
therefore, Mounteer does not have the burden, as UP&L urges, to 
show that the harm was intentional. The case then becomes one of 
ordinary, negligent or reckless slander; the only issue is 
whether slander is within the compensation scheme of the Act. 
On the other hand, if discovery establishes as true 
UP&L's allegations that Larsen intended the slander, then to 
establish vicariously liability under Bryan, Mounteer must 
arguably prove that UP&L intended to harm him.6 Since there was 
no discovery, UP&L's intent is unknown; it remains a question of 
fact to be resolved through discovery and trial. 
In 1987 at the hearing in the lower court, counsel had 
no reason to know or suspect that UP&L may have intended any harm 
to Mounteer. However, since that time, a great deal of 
information has come forth with respect to the investigation of 
the Wilberg Mine disaster, together with a four week trial in 
Provo in 1990 in which Mounteer was a witness against UP&Lfs 
b
 Mounteer takes the position that since slander is outside 
the workers' compensation scheme, Bryan does not apply and intent 
to injure is irrelevant in a civil suit. If this view is 
correct, UP&L's vicarious liability is determined not under Bryan 
but under Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P. 2d 771 (Utah 1988) and 
Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1989) 
7 
position. This leaves many unanswered questions about UP&L's 
motives. Those motives and unanswered questions need to be 
probed under the light of cross-examination. The circumstances 
are suspicious.7 Mounteer does not make accusations, but only 
asks questions. Discovery needs to be pursued on these issues. 
A motion to dismiss should not be granted where factual issues 
remain which could support plaintiff's cause of action. 
POINT II 
THE STATEMENTS OF LARSEN ON OCTOBER 6, 1986, 
WHILE NEGLIGENT, DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN 
"ACCIDENT" UNDER THE ACT. 
A. Curious Inconsistency. Point II of UP&L's brief 
argues that from its "point of view ... the ... Wilberg Mine fire 
and Larsen1 s acts on October 6, 1986, and the injuries which 
befell Mounteer were accidental." UP&L Brief, p. 9. UP&L then 
claims that such "accidents" were designed to be treated as 
industrial, thus proscribing a civil lawsuit. UP&L Brief, p. 10. 
This is grossly inconsistent with UP&L's position in Point I, 
where, for the purpose of avoiding vicarious liability, it argues 
that slander is "intentional." In other words, when UP&L wants 
7
 Is it possible that UP&L wanted Mounteer discredited as a 
witness for being on drugs? Was UP&L trying to avoid long-term 
disability and/or workers1 compensation benefits for Electric 
Mutual, UP&L's wholly-owned insurance company? Did security 
agent Larsen call the mine foreman to report Mounteerfs alleged 
drug abuse over a mine loudspeaker, with several hundred people 
listening, and then persist in the report after she was informed 
that she was on a loudspeaker? If so, why? Why did she feel 
compelled to make the report to the mine superintendent that day 
rather than to her superiors within the UP&L security structure? 
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to avoid vicarious liability under Bryan, Larsen's statements are 
intentional. When UP&L is arguing that Larsen's acts fall under 
the workers1 compensation scheme, it argues that they are 
"accidental." 
B. Confusion Between "Accidental" and "Accident." 
UP&L misconstrues Mounteer's position by claiming that because 
Mounteer denies an "accident," Larsen's acts were intentional. 
Without discovery, Larsen's motives are simply unknown, but it is 
also legally irrelevant. Mounteer's position, entirely 
consistent, is that Larsen's acts did not constitute an "accident 
under the Act." Mounteer Brief, p. 8-9. In order for there to 
be an "accident under the Act" for which exclusivity bars a civil 
suit, there must be an injury of the nature and type contemplated 
under the Act. Mounteer's position is that slander is not a 
compensable injury under the Act; therefore, there is no 
"accident." 
UP&L's arguments confuse the terms "accident" and 
"accidental," insisting that if Larsen's acts were "accidental" 
[i.e., negligent], they must also be an "accident." Not true. 
Slander is outside the workers' compensation scheme for policy 
and historical reasons. Therefore, Larsen's acts of October 6, 
1986, could be quite "accidental" in the sense of being negligent 
and still not be an "accident" under the Act for the policy 
reasons set forth in Point I, Mounteer's Brief. 
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POINT III 
MOUNTEER1S INJURIES SHOULD NOT BE CONSTRUED 
AS PURELY PERSONAL INJURIES, SIGNIFICANT 
DAMAGE TO REPUTATION EXISTS AND HAS BEEN 
ALLEGED. REPUTATION DAMAGE SHOULD BE ASSUMED 
IN A MOTION TO DISMISS ON A SLANDER CASE. 
A. UP&L's Straw Man Approach. UP&L again employs a 
straw man approach, mischaracterizing Mounteerfs position, and 
then addressing its argument to that mischaracterized position. 
UP&L incorrectly states that Mounteer "describes his injuries 
exclusively as injuries which are compensable under the ... Act." 
(emphasis added) UP&L Brief, p. 11. UP&L characterizes 
Mounteerfs complaint as claiming only "personal injuries 
consisting of mental trauma, distress and emotional, disorders." 
UP&L Brief, p. 12. While acknowledging that Mounteer sought 
damages in paragraph 2 of the ad damnum clause for "damage to 
reputation," UP&L urges that the claim be ignored on a pleading 
technicality. 
B. Complaint Raises Reputation Damage. Paragraph 1 of 
the prayer (See Appendix 1) does indeed ask for personal injury 
damages of $500,000. However, paragraph 2 asks for not less 
than $3 00,000 "for general damages for embarrassment, suffering, 
damage to reputation, and such other damages as may be proved at 
trial." Thus, non-personal injury damages are clearly sought in 
the complaint. It is therefore difficult to understand UP&L's 
allegation that the complaint is "exclusively for personal 
injuries which have a medical identity, physical and mental 
10 
impact and are medically treated," (emphasis added) UP&L Brief, 
p. 13. 
UP&L emphasizes that the words "damage to reputation" 
do not appear in the body of the complaint, and states in a 
footnote "a mere naked prayer unsupported by affirmative 
allegations" cannot cure a defective pleading. In support of 
this proposition, UP&L cites, but severely distorts the holding 
of, two out-of-state cases.8 Moreover, Mounteer's complaint is 
hardly a "naked prayer unsupported by affirmative allegations." 
The allegations of slander in the body of the complaint are 
detailed, comprising approximately 12 separately-numbered 
paragraphs. It is an inadvertent omission that Mounteer failed 
to mention damage to reputation by name in the general 
allegations, but it is false to say that it was not discussed. 
Paragraph 7 alludes to reputation when it says that the slander 
was "being broadcast on the public address system ... to the 
5
 In In re Somers1 Estate, 187 P.2d 433 (Cal. App. 1947), a 
will contestant voluntarily dismissed her contest after the 
defendant bank filed its answer. The bank's answer raised no 
affirmative defenses, asked no affirmative relief and did not ask 
for a probate of the will; only the prayer requested that the 
will be probated. This form of an answer violated a California 
probate statute. In this context, the court held that the naked 
affirmative allegation in the prayer was defective. A much 
different situation exists in Mounteer where affirmative relief 
for slander was definitely stated in the body of the complaint. 
In Campbell v. Benson, 637 P.2d 578 (N.M. 1981), a complaint 
stated absolutely no cause of action against one of two 
defendants, but the prayer asked for joint and several relief 
against both defendants. Since the plaintiff had not even 
attempted to seek relief against this particular defendant, the 
New Mexico court held in that context that a mere prayer for 
relief under joint and several liability did not create a cause 
of action. Neither of these cases is remotely similar to Mounteer. 
11 
effect that plaintiff was on drugs," which statements were 
communicated "to many of defendants other employees," It was 
alleged that "plaintiff sustained severe damage from the false 
allegations in that it caused him severe mental and emotional 
damage," which is exactly what damage to reputation does. 
Additionally, paragraph 18 indicates that the damages include, 
"but are not limited to" post-traumatic stress disorder, anguish 
and depression. Thus, other damages (i.e., reputation) are 
clearly implied in the body of the complaint. 
Even if plaintiff has technically erred by not having 
the words "reputation damage" clearly in the body of the 
complaint, such error is not at all fatal. Utah has "notice" 
pleading. Rule 8(a) U.R.C.P. requires only that the plaintiff 
state "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the 
pleader is entitled to relief," and "demand for judgment for the 
relief to which he deems himself entitled." There is no 
requirement that every form of damage for slander be set forth in 
the body of the complaint. Plaintiff need only show that he is 
"entitled to relief." Rule 8(f) states that all pleadings "shall 
be so construed as to do substantial justice." 
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a complaint need 
only give "fair notice" of the nature and basis or grounds of the 
claim and an indication of the type of litigation. This is 
sufficient unless the plaintiff would be entitled to no relief 
under any stated facts which could be proved in support of the 
claim. Blackham v. Snelgrove, 3 Utah 2d 157, 280 P.2d 453 
12 
(1955). Rule 8(a) is to be liberally construed when determining 
the sufficiency of a plaintiff's complaint. Gill v. Timm, 720 
P. 2d 1352 (Utah 1986). Liberal construction requires that 
Mounteer be deemed to have pled non-physical "proprietary" 
damage. 
UP&L further misunderstands inferences on a motion to 
dismiss. The appellate court "... must construe the complaint 
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and indulge all 
reasonable inferences in plaintiff's favor." (emphasis added) 
Mounteer, supra at 733 P.2d at 406; see also Arrow Indus, v. 
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 767 P.2d 935, 936 (Utah 1988). A 
dismissal is appropriate only where it appears to a certainty 
11
. . . that the plaintiff would not be entitled to relief under any 
stated facts which could be proved in support of the claims 
asserted." Mounteer, Id. ; see also Freegard v. First W. Nat'l 
Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 (Utah 1987). Certainly, this court 
should indulge Mounteer the inference that he is claiming 
reputation and similar damages. Furthermore, regardless of 
whether Mounteer had pled such damage, such a "state of facts" 
can be proved in support of his claims, particularly since 
several hundred people from a small town heard the slanderous 
allegations that day. 
C. The Focus of the Action. UP&L's Point III, if 
factually accurate, would make the most sense. Theoretically, if 
che totality of the damage comprised otherwise compensable 
personal injuries, with no claim of "proprietary" damage, one 
13 
might ask why workers1 compensation could not sufficiently deal 
with the problem. UP&L's attempts to reshape the case in these 
terms are, of course, illusory and exaggerated. UP&L states: 
Mounteerfs pleadings, his oral argument 
before the trial court and the Utah Court of 
Appeals, and his pleadings filed in 
connection with his clients [sic] to the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, all describe 
his injuries as injuries which are 
compensable under the Utah Workers 1 
Compensation Act. (emphasis added) 
UP&L Brief, p. 14. UP&L does not cite any relevant "argument 
before the trial court" in support of this statement, and with 
good reason. In the oral argument before the trial court, 
defense counsel himself acknowledged notice that Mounteer was 
claiming reputation damage when he stated: 
[Mr Proctor] They've also alleged that he 
has suffered not only damage to his 
reputation, and embarrassment and humiliation 
the classic defamation damages but also as a 
result of the incident, he suffered emotional 
distress; and has at times, been hospitalized 
and is at the present time, physically and 
emotionally incapable of any form of 
employment; he's totally disabled from 
employment. That is the allegation and that 
must be accepted as true. (emphasis added) 
Oral Argument on Motion to Dismiss, July 30, 1987, p. 5, line 4. 
(See relevant pages in Appendix 2.) 
Later in response to questioning by the judge, 
Mounteer1s counsel summarized his damage claims as follows: "But 
all I am saying is, that the primary thrust of our complaint is 
non-physical damages. Primary thrust." Oral Argument, supra at 
p.22, line 18. Later, Mounteer!s counsel reaffirmed that the 
main gist of his complaint was damage to reputation: 
[Mr. Sykes] But as far as a workers1 comp 
issue, I think you look at the employment 
relation and workers1 comp is designed to 
cover an accident that causes injury; and I 
cited the Allen case there. Cited that 
extensively and slander. The real gist of 
slander is not a physical injury, but damage 
to reputation. (emphasis added) 
Oral Argument, supra at 27-8. 
UP&L likewise states that Mounteer focused on physical 
injuries in the oral argument before the Court of Appeals. 
However, there is no citation to the transcript, and counsel's 
recollection is otherwise. 
Lastly, UP&L claims that Mounteer1 s "pleadings11 with 
the Industrial Commission describe injuries which are compensable 
under the Act. UP&L attaches 11 pages of documents in support of 
this claim that are not a part of the record on appeal, and in 
violation of Rule 11(a) and (h), Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. Mounteer strenuously objects to consideration of 
these documents. Normally, Mounteer would not address such 
matters because they are not relevant to the decision to be made 
by this court. Nevertheless, because of the possible prejudice 
that might be engendered, these documents are addressed. 
The first document is a UP&L in-house "Occupational 
Injury Investigation Report." It was filled out by an agent of 
the employer a day after the slander. It shows that the employer 
treated the incident as an industrial occurrence. It is hard to 
see how the employer's view of the accident, perhaps self-
serving, could prejudice Mounteer. The same could be said with 
respect to the "Employer's First Report of Injury." Such forms 
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are filled out by non-law trained supervisors, who describe the 
problem as best they can. There is certainly no box on these 
forms for "damage to reputation." To expect the issue of slander 
to be dealt with by on-site supervisors under these circumstances 
is preposterous. UP&Lfs supervisory employees rightfully focused 
on the physical and psychological results of such slander, which 
were severe. However, the fact that UP&L's own employees focused 
on these physical and psychological consequences does not in the 
least detract from the severe damage to Mounteer1s reputation, 
which induced those physical problems. This is alluded to in the 
"Supplemental Report of Physician" dated April 7, 1987 (six 
months after the incident), where the physician stated that 
Mounteer's problems were "compounded by stress resulting from 
paranoid personality triggered by remarks made to him by 
management personnel." (emphasis added) 
UP&L attaches three letters from representatives of 
Energy Mutual, its wholly-owned industrial carrier. If anything, 
these letters stand for the proposition that Mounteer was not 
treating this as an industrial claim because he allegedly refused 
to send releases and other information Electric Mutual needed to 
process the case as an industrial claim. 
Finally, UP&L claims that the "Claim for Protection of 
Rights" ("Claim") filed by counsel on June 8, 1989, constitutes 
some sort of admission that this is really an industrial case. A 
simple review of the language of the Claim indicates otherwise. 
Paragraph 6 recites that the notice is filed only for the purpose 
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of protecting Mounteerfs right to eventually file an industrial 
claim if the Court of Appeals decision is sustained, because said 
decision held that the incident was a compensable industrial 
accident. In the event the Court of Appeals decision was upheld 
by the Utah Supreme Court, Mounteer would then file a claim for 
workers1 compensation. The Claim was filed as a precautionary 
measure in accordance with Rule 490-1-3 (G) of the Rules of the 
Industrial Commission (Appendix 3) , which provides that such a 
form may be filed by an applicant for the "purpose of protecting 
his/her rights even though a dispute does not exist.11 
UP&L is incorrect and premature in claiming that 
Mounteer*s focus is entirely personal injuries. Such a 
determination could only be made after a full opportunity for 
discovery, and only assuming that Mounteer was unable to 
demonstrate any damage to reputation or other proprietary 
interest (which is highly unlikely). At this point, however, 
this Court should indulge Mounteer that he can prove proprietary 
damage under the undisputed facts (i.e., the slander was 
broadcast to a large number of small-town residents over a 
loudspeaker at the mine during working hours). Therefore, 
granting the motion to dismiss was in error. 
CONCLUSION 
Mounteer has alleged actionable conduct against UP&L 
because the employer is vicariously liable for slander committed 
within the scope of an employee's employment, whether or not the 
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slander was intentional or negligent. UP&L cannot escape 
liability on the theory that its actions constituted an 
"accident" under the act, since slander is not an injury within 
the compensation scheme of the act. 
Mounteer presents a compensable civil claim because the 
complaint seeks money for damage to reputation and other 
proprietary interests, as well as for personal injuries which 
resulted from the slander. In this regard, the complaint must be 
broadly read, with every reasonable inference in favor of 
Mounteerfs position, and construed to do substantial justice. 
When the complaint is so viewed, it states a cause of action, 
even under UP&Lfs theory in the case. 
Lastly, any dismissal at the present time under any 
theory of the case is premature, since certain facts upon which 
a dismissal must be based cannot be determined without 
discovery. Therefore, the trial court's decision should be 
reversed and the case remanded for further
 m proceedings, 
discovery and trial. 
DATED this 8th day of November, 1990. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
R6BERT? B. SYKES t 
Attorney for Appellant 
Percy Mounteer 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PERCY MOUNTEER, 
Pla in t i f f , 
v . 
UTAH POWER & LIGHT COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
,} -COM 
) 
) 
Civil No.^f 7-J 7f/ 
(Judge / 
Plaintifff for cause of action, complains and alleges 
against defendant as follows: 
THE PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Emery County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendant is a public utility and a corporation 
licensed to do business in the State of Utah and does business in 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
3. Niki Larsen, at all times relevant hereto, was an 
employee of the defendant, employed in the Administrative Office 
of the defendant as Chief of Security. At all times relevant 
herein, Larsen was acting with actual or apparent authority of 
defendant UP&L. 
4. At all relevant times herein, the plaintiff was an 
employee of the defendant, Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&L"), 
APPENDIX 1 
in its Mining Division. 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
5. On or about October 6, 1986, plaintiff was working 
as a warehouseman at Des-Be-Dove Mine, in Emery County. 
6. On October 6, 1986, the plaintiff was in a 
substantial, elevated state of stress, caused by the defendant, 
for the following reasons: 
(a) In December, 19 84, at the time of the 
well-known Wilburg Mine accident, plaintiff was a dispatcher at 
the Wilburg Mine. 
(b) Plaintiff was called by a belt boss in the 
"fifth right" area and told that there was a fire in the minef 
and the plaintiff should shut off the power. 
(c) The plaintiff proceeded to shut down the 
power to the entire mine, having understood that as the directive 
of the belt boss. 
(d) As a result of the shutting off of power in 
the mine, those charged with the responsibility of fighting the 
fire were not able to get power to run the hoses and to pump the 
poisonous air out of the mine. 
(e) Plaintiff attempted to consult with various 
management personnel at UP&L about the problem because he felt a 
sense of guilt since he was the individual who had the power 
turned off to the mine. In addition, several months afner the 
disaster, plaintiff was transferred to the guardhouse at the 
front gate of the mine. In this position, he was required to 
interface with widows and family members of the deceased miners. 
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(f) Because of the great strain caused by these 
activities, he sought advice and help from various personnel 
employed by a subsidiary of the defendant, Emery Mining Company. 
(g) On one occasionf he was told by Gene Shockey, 
President of Emery Mining Company, to tell the grieving families 
essentially to "get lost" because nothing was owed by the company 
to these people, 
(h) Plaintiff was forced to live with this 
pressure until it caused significant problems in his personal 
life. 
7. While the plaintiff was in this agitated state, 
defendant's agent, Niki Larsen, came to the Des-Be-Dove Mine on 
October 6, 1986, and, in violation of company policy, and on an 
open-page system that was connected to loudspeakers, knowingly 
communicated to many of defendant's other employees the 
allegation that defendant was on drugs. When advised by another 
of defendant's employees that it was being broadcast on the 
public-address system, Larsen persisted and continued to make 
allegations to the effect that plaintiff was on drugs. 
8. The allegations were totally false. 
9. Defendant's agent, Niki Larsen, had been 
instructed by her superiors in the defendant's organization to 
investigate the plaintiff for drug use. UP&L had specific 
procedures that were to be followed when someone was suspected of 
drug use. 
10. Plaintiff sustained severe damage from the false 
allegations in that it caused him severe mental and emotional 
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damage, to the extent that he had to check into a psychiatric 
hospital for treatment. 
11. Plaintiff has sustained, as a result of the 
actions of the defendant, a severe aggravation of post-traumatic 
stress disorder, such that he is permanently and totally disabled 
from employment. 
12. Plaintiff has incurred substantial medical costs 
and is expected to incur substantial medical expenses in the 
future. 
13. At the time of defendant's actions in this case, 
plaintiff was making approximately $32,000.00 per year. Since 
the defendant's actions, he has been incapable of working and is 
not expected to work in the future. 
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION 
- Slander -
14. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above. 
15. The statement made by the defendant's agent was 
false and defamatory in that it alleged that plaintiff was on 
drugs when such was not the case. 
16. The publication of the defamatory statement by 
Larsen was not privileged and, in fact, was in violation of the 
company's procedures with respect to allegations of drug use in 
any event. 
17. The actions of the defendant, by and through its 
agent, were intentional or at least grossly negligent. 
18. Plaintiff sustained extensive damages to his 
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psychological, mental and emotional wellbeing, including but not 
limited to, post-traumatic stress disorder, anguish and 
depression. In addition, the plaintiff has been permanently 
damaged in his occupation such that he is permanently and totally 
disabled. He has also sustained extensive medical costs and will 
have substantial future costs. 
19. Plaintiff is entitled to punitive damages because 
of the intentional, malicious and outrageous nature of the 
conduct involved. 
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION 
- Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress -
20. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above. 
21. The actions of the defendant, by and through its 
agent, constituted extreme and outrageous conduct which 
intentionally or recklessly caused severe emotional distress to 
the plaintiff. 
22. Defendant is liable for the damages set forth in 
paragraphs 9 through 13, 18 and 19 above. 
THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION 
- Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress -
23. Plaintiff incorporates by reference the 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 13 above. 
24. In the alternative, and in the event that the 
actions of the defendant herein were neither intentional nor 
reckless, then the defendant's actions were negligent. 
25. Defendant's conduct was extreme and outrageous, 
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and caused severe emotional distress to the plaintiff. 
26. Defendant is liable for the damages set forth in 
paragraphs 9 through 13, 18 and 19 above. 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment against defendant 
as follows: 
1. For judgment for slander, in the amount of 
$500,000, or such other sum as may be proved, for permanent total 
disability due to post-traumatic stress disorder. 
2. For $300,000, or such other sum as may be proved 
at trial, for general damages for embarrassment, suffering, 
damage to reputation, and other such damages as may be proved at 
trial. 
3. For medical expenses in such an amount as 
plaintiff has incurred, and for an amount that he will incur in 
the future. 
4. In the event that any defense is raised in bad 
faith and without merit, for an award of attorney's fees. 
5. For costs of court herein. 
6. For such other relief as the Court may deem just 
in the premises. 
DATED this 5th day of June, 1987. 
/ROfiURf £. SYKSS U / / 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Plaintiff's Address: 
96 East 200 North 
Huntington, UT 84528 
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1J-07 West North Temole 
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1 negligence in infliction of emotional distress and 
2 we'll get to that. In essence, they've alleged that Ms. Lars<| 
3 committed an intentional wrong, which resulted in injury to 
4 Mr. Mounteer. They've also alleged that he has suffered not 
5 only damage to his reputation,and embarassment and humiliatioj 
6 the classic defamation ctoiages but also as a result of the 
7 incident, he suffered emotional distress rand has at times, 
8 been hospitalized and i s * the present time, physically and 
9 emotionally incapable of any form of employment;he's totally 
10 disabled from employment. That is the allegation and that 
U must be accepted as true. There is also no allegation that 
12 Utah Power and Light Company, as a corporation or any of its1 
13 officers/ or directors or managing agents, in any way,directsfci 
14 Ms. Larsen to go to the Des-3e-Dove Mine site and defame Mr. 
15 Mounteer or to intentionally inflict emotional distress upon 
16 him. There is no allegation the defamation or intentional 
17 act was intended by Utah Power and Light Company, the employe 
18 The Utah Supreme Court in Bryan versus Utah Internat-
19 -ional, has answered that question with certainty;and that isj 
20 absolutely not. Without active participation by the employer, 
21 or through intent or direction,an employer is not liable to ajn 
22 employee for the intentional tort of a fellow employee and 
23 does not matter whether the intentional tort is defamation, 
24 assault, intentional infliction of emotional distress or any 
25 other tort classified as an iritertlicxx a3. one. The employer 
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the scope of her authority. And the second factor 
that I think is not clear from the argument that has been 
|given so far is, that we're alleging damages that are primari-) 
-ly psychological in nature. Mr. Proctor kept referring to 
[physical injuries. Well, there is an oblique reference in 
(paragraph 18 of our Complaint in Paragraph 10, general alleg-
ations applicable to all of the causes of action. Says herel, 
" Plaintiff sustained severe damage from the false allegations! 
in that it caused many severe mental and emotional damagesto 
|the extent that he had to check into a psychiatric hospital 
for treatment." Then we say in Paragraph 11, that he sustain} 
severe aggravation of post-traumatic distress disorder. 
Nov/, if you take an expansive definition of psycholo-l 
Igical and say that anything that is psychological is physical,| 
pT guess that yeah, you could read it that way. We're saying 
mental, emotional, psychological. Obviously he had some 
physical manifestations from that too. If you have a headache), 
you might get a stomach ache too. But all I am saying is, 
that the primary thrust of our Complaint is non-physical 
damages. Primary thrust. These are two important factors 
fchat you have to bear in mind as I make my argument here briefly. 
But addressing the Worker's Comp situation. First I think that 
(the first inquiry here is, what is the nature of the employment) 
relation? Clearly if Niki Larser. had come down at the request) 
|of U.P. and L to the corner drugstore in Price, Utah and made 
MR, SYK2S: Ok. That's within the scope of the 
inve st igat ion. 
THE COURT: I don't think the scope of the investi] 
-gation in that case would protect your client from jumpin' 
out the window and killing himself. The scope of the invest^ 
-igation was to see whether or not he was on drugs. She 
opens the door and hollers at the guys passing by, Look, 
there is a guy in here on drugs about ready to kill himself. 
Come give me a hand. That within the scope of the investi-{ 
-gation2 
MR. SYKES: I would think so. Her job was to 
investigate. 
THE COURT: I think you and I disagree on that onej 
Go ahead. 
MR. SYKZS: That's at issue here. I clearly beliejve 
that. Well, I think there is no allegation to my knowledge 
here that she was not acting within the scope of her authori-J 
-ty, he does say. 
THE COURT: No, I understand that, no. No. He's 
just questioning the sufficiency of your pleadings as they're) 
set forth. Allright? 
MR. SYICSS: But as far as the Worker's Comp issue, 
I think you look at the employment relation and Worker's Comrj 
is designed to cover an accident that causes injury;and Z 
cited the Allen case there. Cited that extensive!^- and slancj 
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The real gist of slander is not a physical injury] 
hut damage to reputation. 
THE COURT: True. 
MR. SYKES: One of the main reasons why it's not 
covered by the exclusivity bar of the Workmen's Compensation 
Act, no accident because there was no physical exertion, no 
impact, and no unexpected or unintended occurrence. The 
Allen case said where you have a pre-existing impairment it 
has to be an unusual exertion. I don't think that you can 
say that the man sitting at his desk doing his job and Niki 
Larsen comes in and says, Are you on drugs? can be said to be 
an unusual exertion to hin, because it's something that he is 
supposed to do, Ok? So I don't think, Your Honor, that there 
is any basis for saying that they are a bar to Worker's Comp-
-ensationrand you'll note, that the only case I cited is one 
of the few cases directly on point of that issue and holds 
that that there is simply no bar for a slander action;not the 
type of injury—the type of action that the Worker's Comp 
Law is designed to bar. 
I would just say, Your Honor, that the proper methojJ 
I think in the examination of whether the employer is liable 
for defamation of Niki Larsen is to ask first of all was she 
operating within the scope of her authority at the time and ijn 
not, then of course Mr. Mounteer can sue Niki Larsen. If she 
was operating under the scope of her authority, then clearly 
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R490. Industrial Conmission, Industrial Accidents, 
R490-1. Workers1 Compensation Rules - Procedures. 
R490-1-1. Definitions. 
A. "Commission11 - means the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
B. "Applicant/Plaintiff" - means an injured employee or his/her 
dependent(s) or any person seeking relief or claiming benefits under the Workers' 
Compensation and/or Occupational Disease and Disability Laws. 
C. "Defendant" - means an employer, insurance carrier, self-insurer, the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund, and/or the Uninsured Employers' Fund. 
D. "Administrative Law Judge" - means a person duly designated by the 
Industrial Commission to hear and determine disputed or other cases under the 
provisions of Title 35, Chapters 1 and 2, and of Title 63, Chapter 46b, U.C.A. 
E. "Insurance Carrier" - includes all insurance companies writing workers' 
compensation and occupational disease and disability insurance, the Workers' 
Compensation Fund, and self-insurers who are granted self-insuring privileges by 
the Industrial Commission. In all cases involving no insurance coverage by the 
employer, the term "Insurance Carrier" includes the employer. 
F. "Medical Panel" - means a panel appointed by the Commission pursuant 
to the standards set forth in Sections 35-1-77 and 35-2-56, U.C.A., which is 
responsible to make findings regarding disputed medical aspects of a compensation 
claim, and may make any additional findings, perform any tests, or make any 
inquiry as the Commission may require. 
G. "Award" - means the finding or decision of the Commission or 
Administrative Law Judge as to the amount of compensation or benefits due any 
injured employee or the dependent(s) of a deceased employee. 
R490-1-2. Authority. 
This rule is being enacted under the authority of Sections 35-1-10 and 
35-2-5, U.C.A. 
R490-1-3. Official Forms. 
A. "Employer's First Report of Injury - Form 122" - This form is used for 
reporting accidents, injuries, or occupational diseases as per Section 35-1-97, 
U.C.A. This form must be filed within seven days of the occurrence of the 
alleged industrial accident or the employer's first knowledge or notification of 
the same. This form also serves as OSHA Form 101. 
B. "Physician's Initial Report of Work Injury or Occupational Disease -
Form 123" - This form is used by all medical practitioners to report their 
initial treatment of an injured employee. 
C. "Chiropractor's Supplemental Report - Form 124" - This form is to be 
filed with the insurance carrier or self-insurer after each 15 treatments 
administered by the chiropractic physician. 
D. "Statement of Insurance Carrier or Self-Insurer with Respect to Payment 
of Benefits - Form 141" - This form is used for reporting the initial benefits 
paid to an injured employee. This form must be filed with or mailed to the 
Industrial Commission on the same date the first payment of compensation is 
mailed to the employee. A copy of this form must accompany the first payment. 
E. "Statement of Insurance Carrier or Self-Insurer with Respect to 
Discontinuance of Benefits - Form 142" - This form is to be used by insurance 
carriers or self-insured employers to notify an employee of the discontinuance 
of weekly compensation benefits. The form must be mailed to the employee and 
filed with the Commission five days before the date compensation stops for any 
reason. 
F. "Application for Hearing - Form 001" - Used by an applicant for 
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instituting an industrial claim against an insurance carrier, self-insured 
employer, or uninsured employer. This form, obtainable from the Industrial 
Commission, must be filed and signed by the injured employee or his/her agent. 
All blanks must be completed to the best knowledge, belief, or information of the 
injured employee. 
G. "Claim for Protection of Rights - Form 002" - Used by an injured 
employee for the sole purpose of protecting his/her rights even though a dispute 
does not exist. Copies are forwarded to all parties concerned. NOTE: THIS FORM 
DOES NOT NEED TO BE FILED WHEN ANY OTHER APPLICATION HAS BEEN FILED. 
H. Claim for Dependents' Benefits and/or Burial Benefits - Form 025" -
This form is used by the dependent(s) of a deceased employee to seek benefits as 
a result of a fatal accident occurring in the course of employment. 
1. This form must be filed before a hearing or an award is made, and 
pleadings will not be accepted in lieu thereof. If pleadings are submitted, the 
attorney so filing will be supplied the form for filing before any proceedings 
are initiated. 
2. The filing of this form by the surviving spouse on behalf of the 
surviving spouse and the surviving spouse's dependent minor children is 
sufficient for all dependents. 
3. Unless otherwise directed by an Administrative Law Judge, the following 
information shall be supplied before an Order or an Award is made: 
(a) A certified copy of the marriage license and birth certificates of 
dependent minor children. If such evidence is not readily available, the 
Commission will determine the adequacy of substitute evidence. 
(b) Adoption papers or other decrees of courts of record establishing legal 
responsibility for support of dependent children. 
(c) If either the deceased employee or surviving spouse has been involved 
in divorce proceedings, copies of decrees and orders of the court should be 
supplied. 
I. "Occupational Disease Claim of Employee - Form 026" - This form is used 
by an employee claiming benefits under the Occupational Disease Disability Act. 
J. "Occupational Disease Claim of Dependent - Form 027" - This form is 
used by the dependent(s) of a deceased employee who died as a result of an 
occupational disease. All provisions of Section G above apply equally to this 
form. 
K. "Insurance Company's and Self-Insurer's Final Report of Injury and 
Statement of Total Losses - Form 130" - This form is used by insurance carriers 
and self-insurers to report the total losses occurring in a claim for any 
benefits. This form must be filed as soon as final settlement is made but in no 
event more than 30 days from such settlement. This form shall be filed for all 
losses including medical only, compensation, survivor benefits, or any 
combination of all so as to provide complete loss information for each claim. 
L. "Dependents' Benefit Order - Form 151" - This form is used by the 
Commission in all accidental death cases where no issue of liability for the 
death or establishment of dependency is raised and only one household of 
dependents is involved. The carrier indicates acceptance of liability by 
completing the top half of the form and filing it with the Commission. 
M. "Medical Information Authorization - Form 046" - This form is used to 
release the applicant's medical records to the Commission or the chairman of a 
medical panel appointed by the Commission. 
N. "Application to Change Doctors - Form 102" - This form must be used by 
the employee pursuant to the provisions of Rule R490-2-8 as contained herein. 
0. "Employee's Notification of Intent to Leave Locality or State, and to 
Change Doctor or Hospital - Form 044" - As per Section 35-1-93, U.C.A., this form 
